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INTRODUCTION: FOURTH REMEDIES DISCUSSION 
FORUM 
David F. Partlett* and Russell L. Weaver** 
The Fourth Remedies Discussion Forum was held at the University 
of Louisville on November 19, 2005.1  As with prior fora, our goal was 
to bring together a small group of prominent remedies scholars to 
discuss matters of common interest.  This year’s forum focused on two 
topics: “tort reform” and “damages in news gathering cases.” 
Most forum articles examined the subject of tort reform, but they 
approached it from an array of perspectives.  Three of the articles 
provide an overview on the subject.  Professor Michael P. Allen’s 
article, A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal “Tort Reform,” 
surveys the major types of tort reform that are “possible” on the federal 
level, and provides commentary on the various types.  The next two 
articles suggest the desirability of a historical approach to tort reform.  
Professor Rachel M. Janutis’s The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the 
Overlooked Legacy of the Progressives notes that tort reform has 
historically involved a debate between corporate, professional, and 
insurance interests, and she urged a focus on Progressive and Populist 
Era history as a way of “assessing constitutional provisions aimed at 
altering the balance of power among the legislature, the judiciary and the 
jury with respect to common law tort remedies.”  Professor Irma 
Russell’s The Logic of Legal Remedies and the Relative Weight of 
Norms: Assessing the Public Interest in the Tort Reform Debate argues 
for a strong correlation of social norms to the tort reform debate.  She 
argues that “[t]ort reform measures should preserve the traditional 
balance and fulfill the basic purposes of tort law that have long provided 
precedent and social ordering,” and that consideration “of the historical 
uses of tort law and the normative baseline for comparing competing 
 
*  Dean and Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
** Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis D. 
Brandeis School of Law. 
 1. Organizers of the Remedies Discussion Forum wish to express their appreciation to 
LexisNexis, Washington & Lee University School of Law & the University of Louisville’s Louis D. 
Brandeis for their financial support which made the forum possible. 
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interests is crucial in the tort reform debate.”  These articles add nicely 
to torts scholarship that draws upon the historic and moral roots of tort 
liability.2 
A couple of articles focus on the problem of statutory damage and 
appeal bond caps.  Professor Doug Rendleman’s Appeal Bond Caps: 
Tort Reform for a Punitive Damages Verdict During Post-Verdict 
Judicial Review analyzes the history of appeal bond caps and proposed 
reforms that limit the amount of caps.  Professor Colleen P. Murphy’s 
Statutory Caps and Judicial Review of Damages examines statutory caps 
on damages and judicial review of awards for excessiveness.  She 
concludes that such caps “should not alter normal judicial review of jury 
awards,” that statutory caps should not be regarded as “benchmarks,” 
and that a court should not reduce an award to the cap if the award 
would still be excessive.  The substantive rights of litigants are much 
influenced by these “caps,” and both papers uncover consequences 
heretofore not well understood. 
A couple of articles question the efficacy and legitimacy of prior 
tort reforms, both legislative and judicial.  Professor Tracy A. Thomas’s 
Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: The 
Right to an Adequate Remedy focuses on the concern that “tort reform 
remedy restrictions work arbitrarily to restrict an individual’s right to a 
meaningful remedy that threatens to dilute common-law rights.”  As a 
result, she argues that “the due process guarantees provide a restraint on 
the tort remedy stripping provisions that deny plaintiffs their 
fundamental right to a meaningful remedy.”3  Professor Caprice Roberts’ 
article, Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards, argues 
that the State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell4 ratios 
applied in reviewing punitive damage awards are irrational as applied in 
civil rights cases because they extinguish access to meaningful punitive 
damages in those types of cases.  The paper drives yet another stake in 
the heart of the ratio test first formulated by Justice O’Connor.5 
The most sweeping suggestion for reform comes from Professor 
Elaine Shoben’s Let the Damages Fit the Wrong: An Immodest Proposal 
for Reforming Personal Injury Damages.  Professor Shoben questions 
 
 2. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to 
a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (arguing that the common law grounds a due 
process right of redress). 
 3. Id. 
 4. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 5. See David Partlett, The Republican Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1409 (2004) (also criticizing the ratio test). 
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the fundamental premise of compensatory damages (the “goal of making 
victims whole”) and suggests a fundamental reformulation of tort law to 
focus on the “wrong.”  She advocates that damages be calculated based 
on three factors: “the degree of the wrongfulness of the tort, the severity 
of the harm, and the extent to which the risky conduct was directed at 
the plaintiff.”  She argues that her approach would “provide a framework 
for assessing damages that would be more consistent across cases and 
more predictable.” 
The last article in this section, Professor Michael Kelly’s What 
Makes the Collateral Source Rule Different?, analyzes Paul H. Rubin 
and Joanna M. Sheperd’s working paper on a “correlation between tort 
reforms and the rate of fatal accidents in the states which adopted these 
tort reforms.”6  He suggests that the paper’s conclusions challenge 
“conventional wisdom” and then analyzes the conclusions as applied to 
the collateral source rule.  He raises methodological issues and questions 
whether the general data on damage caps can be generalized to the 
collateral source rule. 
The final two articles deal with issues relating to defamation and 
privacy.  In our article, Remedies, Neutral Rules and Free Speech, we 
argue that the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan7 produced robust speech, shed the shackles of 
defamation law, and embraced earlier decisions limiting press licensing 
provisions and prohibiting prior restraints.  However, as it became 
difficult for defamation plaintiffs to recover large damage judgments, 
litigants have shifted their focus to non-defamation theories and to a 
focus on the methods by which information is generated.  The article 
analyzes the efficacy of those alternate theories as an effective measure 
of recovery and the impact of liability on free speech.  Last, but not 
least, Professor John McCamus’s Celebrity Newsgathering and Privacy: 
The Transformation of Breach of Confidence in English Law analyzes 
the tort of invasion of privacy and, in particular, the branch involving 
breach of confidence.  Breach of confidence has been broadened to 
protect privacy interests, in the absence of a privacy tort.  In respect of 
genetic information, one of us has argued that a breach of confidence 
action has distinct advantages over privacy theories.8  The comparative 
development of privacy law in the courts of our common law cousins 
 
 6.  Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Sheperd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, EMORY LAW 
SCHOOL LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING GROUP, Paper No. 05-17 (2006). 
 7.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 8.  David Partlett, Misuse of Genetic Information: The Common Law and Professionals’ 
Liability, 42 WASHBURN L. J. 489 (2003). 
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bears close observation.  Professor McCamus’s article will spur that 
examination. 
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